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Georgia v. McColl urn : An Unprincipled and 
Potentially Unjust Ending to the 
Peremptory Challenge Cases 
The peremptory challenge has traditionally been consid- 
ered fundamental to the empaneling of a fair jury.' Even so, 
because the peremptory challenge may be used in a racially 
discriminatory manner, its constitutionality has recently been 
examined by the United States Supreme Court. Between 1986 
and 1992 the Supreme Court decided several cases involving 
alleged racial discrimination during the exercise of peremptory 
 challenge^.^ In the most recent peremptory challenge case, 
Georgia u. M~Collum,~ the Supreme Court held that a criminal 
defendant's4 exercise of a racially discriminatory peremptory 
challenge is un~onstitutional.~ The Court indicated that 
McCollum merely follows precedents established in other pe- 
remptory challenge cased 
This note discusses the Court's decision in McCollum. Part 
I1 summarizes the cases which precede McCollum and upon 
which the Court relied. Part I11 presents the specific facts of 
McCollum and examines the reasoning used by the Court in 
reaching its decision. Part IV analyzes the Court's reasoning 
and focuses on two specific issues: the requirement of state 
action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
1. In Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), Justice Blackmun recog- 
nized the " 'very old credentials,' of the peremptory challenge and . . . the 'long 
and widely held belief that the peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by 
jury.' " Id. at  2358 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia called the right to exercise the 
peremptory challenge an "ages-old right of criminal defendants . . . to secure a 
jury that they consider fair." Id. at  2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Douglas 
L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition 
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL . REV. 1, 10-12 
(1990) (giving a history of the use of peremptory challenges in the United States). 
2. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. 
Ct. 2077 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79 
3. 
4. 
to refer 
5. 
6. 
(1986). 
112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). 
The term "criminal defendant" or "defendant" is used throughout this note 
to the criminal defendant as well as the criminal defendant's counsel. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359. 
Id. at 2352-53. 
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Amendment and the importance of the criminal defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury. This note 
concludes that McCollum was decided incorrectly; the holding 
is not supported by the Constitution and will work potentially 
unjust results for criminal defendants. 
In 1880 the Supreme Court decided Strauder v. West Vir- 
ginia,' the first important case dealing with the interplay of 
race relations and the sitting of a jury. In Strauder an African- 
American, indicted for murder, was convicted and sentenced by 
an all-white jury.' While the West Virginia Supreme Court 
f i rmed  the conviction, the United States Supreme Court re- 
versed, holding that the West Virginia law that qualified only 
white persons for jury duty violated the defendant's right to 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend~nent.~ 
Nearly a century later, in Swain u. Alabama,1o the Su- 
preme Court focused on the specific issue of racial bias in the 
exercise of a peremptory challenge. This decision was the first 
in a line of decisions that could be called the peremptory chal- 
lenge cases." Swain, an African-American, was convicted of 
rape and sentenced t o  death.12 Of the eight African-Americans 
on the venire, two were exempted and six were peremptorily 
struck by the prose~ution.'~ Notwithstanding the exclusion of 
the African-American jurors, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction, holding that exclusion of African-Americans by the 
prosecution's peremptory challenges raised only an inference of 
discrimination. Before a defendant's constitutional rights could 
be shown to have been violated, a more extensive pattern of 
discrimination had to be demonstrated over a period of time.14 
7. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
8. Id. at 304. 
9. Id. at 310-12. 
10. 380 US. 202 (1965). 
11. The peremptory challenge cases began in 1965 with Swain and include 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US. 79 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); and Georgia v. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). 
12. Swain, 380 US. at 203. 
13. Id. at 205. 
14. Id at 227. 
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In Batson v. Kentucky1' the Supreme Court lessened the 
"discrimination over a period of time" requirement of Swain. 
Batson dealt with an African-American who had been "indict- 
ed. . . on charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of 
stolen  good^."'^ The prosecution peremptorily struck the four 
African-Americans on the venire and the defendant was subse- 
quently convicted by an all-white jury.'' The Supreme Court 
remanded, holding that the defendant had made a timely objec- 
tion to  the peremptory challenges; therefore, if "the facts estab- 
lish[ed], prima facie, purposeful discrimination," the burden 
shifted to the prosecution to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation for the peremptory ~hallenges.'~ The Supreme 
Court extended the reach of the Batson decision in Powers v. 
0hio19 by holding that a criminal defendant may object to  the 
prosecution's race-biased peremptory challenges even if the 
defendant and the excluded juror are not of the same race.20 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete CO.~' shifted the Court's 
analysis to a civil dispute. In Edmonson an African-American 
construction worker sued Leesville Concrete for the alleged 
negligence of one of its  employee^.'^ During voir dire the de- 
fendant eliminated two African-Americans from the venire.23 
The plaintiff, citing Batson, requested a race-neutral explana- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  The district court denied the request, holding that 
Batson did not apply to  civil  proceeding^.^^ On appeal, the Su- 
preme Court reversed26 and held racially discriminatory pe- 
15. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
16. Id. at 82. 
17. Id. at 83. 
18. Id. at 100. Enforcement of this standard may highlight the very discrimi- 
nation it is intended to eliminate. Albert Alschuler points out the difficulty of en- 
forcing the Batson Court's standard: "[Tlhe Court posed issues whose resolution 
may require the judiciary to draw lines every bit as ugly and invidious as those 
that the Court condemned." Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: 
Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U .  CHI. L. 
REV. 153, 169 (1989). 
19. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). 
20. Id. at 1366. 
21. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). 
22. Id. at 2080. 
23. Id. at 2081. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 2089. 
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remptory challenges exercised by civil litigants to be unconsti- 
t~ t iona l .~ '  
This line of Supreme Court decisions regarding race-biased 
peremptory challenges left open the issue of peremptory chal- 
lenges exercised by criminal  defendant^.^' McCollum closed 
this gap when the Court disallowed race-biased peremptory 
challenges by criminal  defendant^.^' 
A. The Facts 
The defendants in McCollum were white Americans in- 
volved in an altercation with two African-Americans. The de- 
fendants were indicted on counts of aggravated assault and 
simple battery. The incident occurred in Dougherty County, 
Georgia, where forty-three percent of the population is African- 
American. The African-American community subsequently 
urged residents not to patronize the defendants' busine~s.~' 
Recognizing the volatile racial situation, the prosecution 
moved the court to prohibit the defendants from exercising 
anticipated discriminatory peremptory  challenge^.^' The mo- 
tion was denied by the trial judge, and on appeal the Supreme 
Court of Georgia affirmed the denial.32 The United States Su- 
preme Court reversed and held that "the Constitution prohibits 
a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimina- 
tion on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory chal- 
l e n g e ~ . " ~ ~  
27. Id. at 2080. 
28. In Batson the Court reserved the issue of criminal defendants for a later 
day. 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986). The McCollum Court acknowledged this by grant- 
ing certiorari "to resolve a question left open by our prior cases." Georgia v. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2352 (1992). 
29. McCollurn, 112 S. Ct. at 2359. 
30. Id. at 2351. 
31. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (Ga. 1991). 
32. Id. 
33. McCollurn, 112 S. Ct. at 2359. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of 
the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, K e ~ e d y ,  
and Souter joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion. Justice 
Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices O'Connor and Scalia 
. filed dissenting opinions. 
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B. The McCollym Court's Reasoning 
Drawing upon earlier cases, the McCollum Court proposed 
a four-part test to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engag- 
ing in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of pe- 
remptory challenges: (1) Does the case address the same harms 
as those addressed in Batson? (2) Does a criminal defendant's 
peremptory challenge qualify as state action for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment? (3) Does the state have standing to 
sue for the injured jury member? (4) Does the defendant have 
an overriding constitutional interest?34 
1. Does McCollum address the same harms as those ad- 
dressed in  Batson? 
In Batson the Court addressed both a public and a private 
harm. With regard to  public harm, the Batson Court stated 
that the integrity of the court system would be questioned by 
the general public if courts allowed criminal prosecutors to 
exercise racially discriminatory peremptory ~hallenges.~~ The 
Court in McCollum believed that race-biased challenges exer- 
cised by a criminal defendant would be viewed by the public in 
virtually the same way as those in Batson. As a result, the 
Court concluded that the public harm addressed in McCollum 
is the same as the public harm addressed in B a t ~ o n . ~ ~  
In addition, the Court found the private harms comparable 
in both cases. With regard to  private harm, the Batson Court 
stated that the discrimination would harm the dignity of the 
person who experiences the dis~rimination.~' Applying this 
consideration, the McCollum Court concluded that a race-bi- 
ased peremptory challenge exercised by a criminal defendant 
would put the excluded juror to public shame. This public 
shame constitutes the same private harm to the dignity of the 
juror as it did in B a t s ~ n . ~ ~  Because both cases involved simi- 
lar harms, the McCollum Court concluded that the anticipated 
34. Id. at 2353. 
35. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,  87 (1986). 
36. See McCollum, 112 S .  Ct. at 2353-54. 
37. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.  
38. McCollum, 112 S .  Ct. at 2353. 
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racial discrimination in McCollum satisfied the public and the 
private harms addressed by Bat~on.~' 
2. Does a defendant's peremptory challenge qualify as state 
action? 
The Court applied the Lugar test4' to decide if the crimi- 
nal defendant's use of the peremptory challenge constituted 
sufficient state action4' for the application of Fourteenth 
Amendment constraints. The Lugar test f i s t  asks whether the 
action has its source in state power.42 The Court decided this 
element of the Lugar test was satisfied in McCollum because 
the peremptory challenges exercised by the criminal defendants 
in McCollum were authorized by the Georgia Code.43 
The second part of the Lugar test asks if the party can 
adequately be described as a state actor." The Court's deci- 
sion in Edmonson added three discrete factors to  this portion of 
the Lugar test.45 The first Edmonson factor asks whether the 
party relied on governmental assistance or benefits.46 The 
McCollum Court decided this factor was satisfied since the 
peremptory challenges exercised in McCollum were equivalent 
to those in Edmonson-which were found t o  be under assis- 
tance of the g~vernment.~' 
The second Edmonson factor inquires whether the action 
being analyzed is a traditional governmental f~nction.~' The 
McCollum Court decided this element was met. The Court felt 
the actions of the criminal defendant in securing a fair jury 
were equivalent to choosing a governmental body necessary to 
the process of j~stice.~'  By being part of the process of choos- 
39. Id. at 2354. 
40. The Lugar test comes from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 
(1982), in which the Court held a private litigant to be a state actor when partici- 
pating in the seizure of property to which the litigant claimed a right. 
41. See discussion infi-a part N.A, see also Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a 
Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in 
a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 811-20 (1989) (discussing the state action 
problem in the setting of criminal defendants). 
42. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. 
43. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-55 (citing GA. CODE ANN. $ 15-12-165 
(1990)). 
44. Lugar, 457 US. at 939, 941-42. 
45. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991). 
46. Id. 
47. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355; see also Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. a t  2083-84. 
48. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083. 
49. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355-56. 
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ing a governmental body, the criminal defendant is involved in 
what the McCollum Court believed to  be a traditional govern- 
mental function.50 
The final Edmonson factor asks whether the injury is ag- 
gravated by governmental Because the perempto- 
ry challenge takes place in the courtroom-thus giving a form 
of governmental approval to  the jury-the McCollum Court 
decided the injury is indeed aggravated by governmental au- 
t h ~ r i t y . ~ ~  Thus, relying on the test founded in Lugar and ex- 
panded in Edmonson, the McCollum Court determined that the 
criminal defendant's exercise of the peremptory challenge con- 
stitutes state action for purposes of the applicable Fourteenth 
Amendment  constraint^.^^ 
3. Does the state have standing to sue for the injured juror? 
To decide if the state has standing to sue for the injured 
juror, the Court 1-ooked to  the Powers test." The Powers test 
initially asks if a concrete injury exists.55 This question was 
already answered by the McCollum Court when it decided that 
race-biased peremptory challenges put the affected juror to 
public shame.56 However, Powers also asks if the suing party 
has a close connection to  the injured third party.57 The 
McCollum Court determined this in the affirmative because a 
sufficiently close connection develops between the state and the 
juror during the process of voir dire.58 
Finally, the Powers test requires that the injured third 
party be unable t o  protect himself or herself.59 The Court 
again felt this factor had been met because the injured juror 
would not have had the resources to bring a suit in this in- 
stance.60 consequently the Court decided, under the Powers 
test, that the state has standing to sue for the injured juror. 
50. Id. . 
51. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. a t  2083. 
52. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. a t  2356. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 2357; Powers v. Ohio, 111 S .  Ct. 1364, 1370-74 (1991). 
55. Powers, 111 S .  Ct. at  1370. 
56. McCoZZum, 112 S .  Ct. a t  2357. 
57. Powers, 111 S .  Ct. at  1370. 
58. McCollum, 112 S .  Ct. a t  2357. 
59. Powers, 111 S .  Ct. at  1370-71. 
60. McCollum, 112 S .  Ct. a t  2357. 
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4. Does the defendant have an overriding constitutional right? 
Because no specific constitutional right to a peremptory 
challenge  exist^,^' the Court focused its analysis of overriding 
constitutional rights on the criminal defendant's Sixth Amend- 
ment right to a fair and impartial Although the 
McCollum Court's holding limits the criminal defendant's use 
of the peremptory challenge, the Court believed the constitu- 
tional rights of the criminal defendant are not offended. The 
criminal defendant has other mechanisms with which to secure 
a fair Accordingly, the Court concluded that limiting 
the criminal defendant's use of the peremptory challenge will 
not threaten the criminal defendant's right to be tried by a fair 
and impartial jury.64 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This analysis of McCollum will focus on two specific issues 
before the Court: the requirement of state action under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to  an impartial 
jury. This focus is appropriate because the Court's decision 
turns upon these constitutional issues. Also, these constitution- 
al issues become especially important when the rights of a 
criminal defendant are at stake.65 By focusing upon these two 
issues, this note will point out the McCollum decision's analyti- 
cal strengths and weaknesses as well as the potentially unjust 
results it could work. 
61. Id. a t  2358. The Court believed that even though there is no constitution- 
al right to a peremptory challenge, the McCollum holding does not have to under- 
mine the validity or usefblness of the peremptory challenge. However, the Court 
did acknowledge that if there were no way to remove race bias from the perempto- 
ry challenge, the Court would have to eliminate the peremptory challenge rather 
than allow such discrimination. Id. 
62. See discussion infra part 1V.B. 
63. The Court $d not mention a specific mechanism, but the challenge for 
cause could be one of the other state-created "mechanism[s] for removing those on 
the venire whom the defendant has specific reason to believe would be incapable of 
confronting and suppressing their racism." McCollum, 112 S. Ct. a t  2358-59. 
64. Id. 
65. See J. Alexander Tanford, Racism in the Adversary System: The 
Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges, 63 S.  CAL. L. REV. 1015, 1015-16 (1990) 
(describing the volatile racial setting in which criminal trials may take place). 
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A. The Requirement of State Action 
A finding of state actiod6 is necessary if the Court is go- 
ing to prohibit the criminal defendant from exercising race- 
biased peremptory challenges. In other words, the actions of 
the criminal defendant are subject to Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection constraints only if the criminal defendant is 
determined to  be a state actor.67 To decide the state action 
requirement, the McCollum Court relied heavily on the previ- 
ous holdings in Lugar and Edmonson. Because the "source in 
state authority" requirement of the Lugar test is satisfied by 
the specific language of the Georgia the operative 
question regarding state action becomes "whether the private 
party charged with the deprivation can be described as a state 
a~tor.'"~ The Supreme Court expanded the "described as a 
state actor" requirement of the Lugar test into the three prongs 
addressed in Edmonson: (1) whether the party relied on gov- 
ernmental assistance and benefits, (2)  whether the actor is 
performing a trahtional governmental function, and (3) wheth- 
er the injury is aggravated by governmental authority." 
These three areas of inquiry were used by the McCollum Court 
as a guideline for determining whether the party involved can 
be adequately described as a state actor. 
1. Reliance on governmental assistance and benefits 
The McCollum Court perfunctorily listed the Georgia stat- 
utes which provide the service of a jury to a criminal defendant 
and concluded that such state involvement satisfies the re- 
quirement of reliance on governmental assistance and benefits. 
The Court supported its finding by stating that the jury system 
" 'simply could not exist' without the 'overt and significant par- 
66. See discussion supra part III.B.2. 
67. Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases the principle 
has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action 
inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only 
such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That 
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however 
discriminatory or wrongful. 
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (citation omitted). 
68. The defendant's right of peremptory challenge is provided for by Georgia 
law. GA. CODE ANN. 9 15-12-165 (1990 & Supp. 1993). 
69. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992). 
70. Id. 
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ticipation of the government.' "71 While it is true that the state 
makes the jury available to the defendant, it is questionable 
whether the defendant, when choosing the jury during voir 
dire, is actually "relying on governmental assistance and bene- 
fits" in the manner intended by Lugar. 
In Lugar the party under state-action analysis brought a 
civil suit in state court and sought governmental assistance for 
a prejudgment atta~hment.?~ The party bringing suit willfully 
became involved with the government in the attachment pro- 
ceeding and willfully relied on governmental assistance. The 
criminal defendant, on the other hand, is being haled into court 
by the state against his or her own will. The criminal defen- 
dant is being tried before a jury provided by the state, but in 
such an adversarial proceeding the criminal defendant is rely- 
ing on governmental assistance only at the government's insis- 
tence. 
To "rely" on the government, as it was found in Lugar, 
certainly requires more volition than that exercised by a crimi- 
nal defendant. In Lugar the Court characterized a party who 
relies on the government as "a willful participant in joint activ- 
ity with the State or its agents."73 The distinction between the 
parties in Lugar and McCollum deserves closer analysis by the 
Court. That the criminal defendant is not a willful participant 
with the government, nor seeks governmental assistance, 
should be considered more fully before a showing of reliance on 
governmental assistance and benefits is found. 
This prong of the test was met only because the Court was 
willing to overlook the specific language in Lugar regarding 
willful participation. If the Court does not examine a party's 
willful participation then the inquiry into reliance is the same 
as the inquiry into the source in state authority. The Lugar 
Court distinguished between these two inquiries. Such a dis- 
tinction should not have been overlooked by the McCollum 
Court without further explanation as to why the state actor 
need not be a willful participant when relying on governmental 
assistance and benefits. 
71. Id. (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 
(1991)). 
72. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). 
73. Id. at 941 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). 
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2. Performing a traditional governmental function 
The McColZum Court concluded that the criminal 
defendant's participation in the seating of a jury by the exercise 
of peremptory challenges is a traditional governmental func- 
tion. The Court believed the exercise of peremptory challenges 
should be viewed as the criminal defendant "assist[ing] the 
government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact."?* 
While it is true that the criminal defendant can exclude certain 
persons from the jury with a peremptory challenge, the Court 
overstated the involvement of the defendant when it described 
the defendant as "selecting" the trier of fact. There is a marked 
difference between the actions of the state in providing a veni- 
re, the actions of the judge in questioning the venire, and the 
actions of the criminal defendant in exercising a limited num- 
ber of peremptory challenges. The defendant does nothing more 
than agree or disagree with those persons called onto the veni- 
re. Such limited involvement by the criminal defendant does 
not rise to the standard enunciated by the McCollum Court as 
"choos[ing] a quintessential governmental body."75 
The Court's conclusion that a criminal defendant exercising 
a peremptory challenge is performing a traditional governmen- 
tal function is further weakened by the obvious side-step of the 
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Polk County u. Dod~on.'~ 
In Dodson the Court determined that "a public defender does 
not qualify as a state actor when engaged in his general repre- 
sentation of a criminal defendant."?? In McCollum the Court 
danced around the Dodson holding by saying there are certain 
occasions where the criminal defendant can be considered a 
state actor and certain occasions where he or she cannot be 
considered a state actor. The exercise of the peremptory chal- 
lenge is an occasion where the Court feels the criminal defen- 
dant does take on the guise of a state actor for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Justice O'Comor, in her dissent in McCollum, pointed out 
the inconsistency of the Court's holding in this specific area: 
"The Court. . . spin[sl out a theory that defendants and their 
74. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991)). 
75. Id. at 2356. 
76. 454 US. 312 (1981). 
77. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356 (footnote omitted). 
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lawyers transmogrify from government adversaries into state 
actors when they exercise a peremptory challenge, and then 
change back to perform other defense f~nctions."'~ Justice 
O'Connor believed Dodson foreclosed the Court's decision in 
McCollum regarding state action and there was no need for 
further inquiry by the Court." Although Dodson may not rule 
out all further inquiry into state action on the part of the crimi- 
nal defendant, it does weaken any analytical support for the 
McCollum Court's finding. By side-stepping Dodson, rather 
than overruling it, the Court provided only weak support for its 
finding of state action and little guidance for future interpreta- 
tion of that finding. 
3. Aggravation of harm by governmental authority 
Because of the negative public perception of discrimination 
occurring in the courtroom, the McCollum Court concluded that 
the public injury is aggravated by governmental authority: 
"Regardless of who precipitated the jurors' removal, the percep- 
tion and the reality in a criminal trial will be that the court 
has excused jurors based on race, an outcome that will be at- 
tributed to the State."8o Such analysis focuses primarily on 
the aggravation of public harm. By limiting its analysis to the 
public harm, the Court passed over the private harm-a factor 
which was vital to the overall harm addressed by the Court in 
Bat~on .~ '  
The private harm involved in a racially discriminatory 
peremptory challenge is a harm to the individual juror who 
experiences the discrimination. Such harm to the individual 
juror is not "aggravated" because it occurred in a courtroom. 
Discrimination is undesirable wherever it may occur-in the 
courtroom, a t  the club, or in school. The courtroom setting 
cannot be determined to categorically increase the personal 
injury of someone who experiences such discrimination. In fact, 
discrimination in the courtroom during peremptory challenges, 
78. Id. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 2356 (footnote omitted). 
81. The Court acknowledged earlier in the opinion that there are injuries to 
both the public and the juror: 'The experience of many state jurisdictions has led 
to the recognition that a race-based peremptory challenge, regardless of who exer- 
cises it, harms not only the challenged juror, but the entire community." Id. at 
2354 n.6. Even so, the focus of the Court's analysis in this part of the opinion was 
on the public injury. 
if it takes place 
di~crimination.'~ 
By focusing 
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may not even be recognized by the juror as 
on the public harm, the Court avoided the 
issue of private harm to  the juror. This is because the private 
harm is not aggravated by the courtroom setting. However, it is 
the injury to  the individual citizen which goes to  the heart of 
the protections guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court's focus under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis should 
be on the private harm and the juror's offended individual 
rights, not on the public image of the system of justice. Because 
the private injury is not increased by a courtroom setting, the 
analysis of the McCollum Court only marginally satisfies the 
"aggravated harm" prong of the state action test. 
Careful analysis of the Lugar test shows that the elements 
of the test are not sufficiently satisfied by the facts of 
McCoZZum: the criminal defendant cannot be singled out as one 
who willfully relies on governmental assistance or benefits as 
did the plaintiff in Lugar; the criminal defendant has very 
limited involvement in the traditional governmental function of 
seating a jury; and the injury is aggravated only for purposes of 
public, not private, harm. 
Given the gravity of the constitutional requirements that 
flow from a finding of state action, the Court should reconsider 
the weak showing which the facts of McCollum make under the 
Lugar test. Of course, if the requirement of state action is con- 
sidered unsatisfied in the setting of criminal defendants, the 
Court would be unable to reach the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and hence unable to  reach the 
alleged racial discrimination. Justice O'Connor commented on 
the role of the state action requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment at the end of her dissent: "That the Constitution 
does not give federal judges the reach to  wipe all marks of 
racism from every courtroom in the land is frustrating, to be 
sure. But such limitations are the necessary and intended con- 
sequence of the Fourteenth Amendment's state action require- 
ment ."83 
82. "Indeed, it is common practice not to reveal the identity of the challeng- 
ing party to the jurors and potential jurors." Id. at 2356 n.8. If the juror is unable 
to attribute the challenge to a certain party, then the racially motivated nature of 
the challenge may not be obvious to the juror. 
83. McColZum, 112 S. Ct. at 2364 (07Connor, J., dissenting). 
1032 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I993 
B. Overriding Constitutional Interests of the 
Criminal Defendant 
As a separate factor in determining its holding, the 
McCollum Court considered the overriding constitutional inter- 
ests of the criminal defendant.84 Under this prong of the test, 
it considered the criminal defendant's right to  a peremptory 
challenge and the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a fair and impartial jury. 
Under an analysis of the criminal defendant's right to a 
peremptory challenge, the Court acknowledged the long history 
and tradition of the peremptory challenge and the "widely held 
belief that the peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial 
by The Court also reaffirmed its statement in 
Edmonson that "the role of litigants in determining the jury's 
composition provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury 
system and of its verdi~ts."~~ ~ v e n  with the recognized impor- 
tance of the peremptory challenge in seating a fair jury, the 
Court felt no constitutional constraints upon its power to limit 
the criminal defendant's free exercise of the peremptory chal- 
lenge: "[Pleremptory challenges are not constitutionally protect- 
ed fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created 
means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury."87 
After discussing the peremptory challenge, the Court 
turned to an analysis of the criminal defendant's constitutional 
rights under the Sixth Amendment. To be sure, this entailed a 
balancing of the Equal Protection Clause and the Sixth Amend- 
ment.88 The criminal defendant's right to a fair and impartial 
jury lost. The Court quickly disposed of the criminal 
defendant's right to  an impartial jury by concluding that it is 
protected by other mechanisms through which the defendant 
84. See discussion supra part III.B.4. 
85. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
219 (1965)); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1985). 
86. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991)). 
87. Id. 
88. We do not believe that this decision will undermine the contribution 
of the peremptory challenge to the administration of justice. Nonethe- 
less, "if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel 
as  fair," we reaffirm today that such a "price is too high to meet the 
standard of the Constitution." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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may remove someone who is supposedly race-biased. The 
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights deserve further examina- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas asserted his own 
arguments against the Court's holding and did not join the 
dissent only because Edmonson "requires the opposite conclu- 
sion" and the state did "not question Edmons~n."~~ Justice 
Thomas's concurring opinion was motivated by his belief that 
McCollum would work unjust results for future criminal defen- 
dants. Although in McCoUurn the Court reached an instance of 
discrimination against an African-American juror by white 
American criminal defendants, Justice Thomas felt there will 
be cases in which an African-American criminal defendant 
wishes to  have a fair and impartial jury. Because of the limita- 
tions upon the peremptory challenge, such a defendant may not 
be able to  remove those whom he or she believes are unable to 
be race-neutral in their performance of jury duty. Adding punc- 
tuation to his feelings of potential injustice, Justice Thomas 
said: "I am certain that black criminal defendants will rue the 
day that this court ventured down this road . . . ."91 
In the courtroom, the criminal defendant is aided greatly 
by the peremptory challenge in securing a fair jury. The right 
to challenge a juror who is suspected, for whatever reason, of 
being unable to render a fair verdict is one which is vital to  the 
protection of the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a fair jury. The Court should not lightly pass over this con- 
stitutional right, o r  conclude so quickly that it will not be af- 
fected by the ruling in McCollum. It was the Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair jury that motivated the Court in the first in- 
89. Because our criminal justice system gives certain advantages to the ac- 
cused, the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury 
may deserve added weight when being balanced against the Equal Protection 
Clause. See Goldwasser, supra note 41, at 821-26 (discussing the advantages which 
are given to the accused a t  trial). Even so, no presumption was given to the ac- 
cused by the McCollum Court when balancing the Sixth Amendment with the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
90. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at, 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
91. Id. at  2360. Justice Thomas's opinion is supported by the Supreme 
Court's holding in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 US. 303 (1880). In Strauder the 
Court acknowledged that "prejudices often exist against particular classes in the 
community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in 
some cases to deny to persons of those classes the fill enjoyment of that protection 
which others enjoy." Id. at  309. 
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stance to call the peremptory challenge a "necessary part of 
trial by 
C. A Proposed Solution: Acknowledge the Fourteenth 
Arnendment's Inability to Reach the Criminal Defendant's 
Peremptory Challenge 
Professor Douglas L. Colbert has suggested the use of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit racial discrimination in the 
exercise of peremptory  challenge^.^^ Professor Colbert feels 
the Thirteenth Amendment would side-step the problem of 
state action required under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such 
a solution to the requirement of state action is no longer neces- 
sary, given the McCollum Court's finding of state action on the 
part of the criminal defendant in exercising peremptory chal- 
lenges. However, Colbert's article forcefully points out the con- 
cerns criminal defendants should have now that the Supreme 
Court has reached the issue of discrimination in the criminal 
defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges: "Criminal defen- 
dants generally rely on the peremptory challenge to assure that 
the selected jurors will be fair and impartial. . . . Although a 
juror's bias, racial or otherwise, may be exposed during the voir 
dire, responses given during this process are unlikely to result 
in a successful challenge for ~ause. '"~ 
The holding of the Court in McCollum will have a direct 
effect on the ability of the criminal defendant to have a fair 
and impartial jury; taking away the peremptory challenge 
leaves the criminal defendant with only a challenge for cause. 
The total elimination of the peremptory challenge, which the 
Court has made a step toward in McCollum, would leave-the 
criminal defendant with insufficient recourse against a race- 
biased jury. 
The Court should have acknowledged the inability of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to reach the area of criminal 
defendants' peremptory challenges. Although the problem of 
discrimination may continue, the laudable cause of eliminating 
such discrimination has been decidedly left to another forum. 
The way in which the Court stretched its analysis of state 
action to reach this area of potential discrimination attests of 
92. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
219 (1965)). 
93. Colbert, supra note 1. 
94. Id. at 121-22 (footnotes omitted). 
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the desire of the Court to stamp out any trace of race discrimi- 
nation, but such actions should not be taken at the expense of 
a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair and impar- 
tial jury. A criminal defendant-who may be facing the pros- 
pect of extended incarceration or even the death penalty-has a 
fundamental and important right to  a fair and impartial jury. 
Because the peremptory challenge is so vital to  securing that 
right, the Supreme Court should not have limited it upon such 
a questionable showing of state action. 
The McCollum Court interpreted the constraints of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause t o  necessi- 
tate holding as unconstitutional race-biased peremptory chal- 
lenges exercised by a criminal defendant. The Court stretched 
the requirement of state action in order to reach the criminal 
defendant with such Fourteenth Amendment constraints. Con- 
sidered analysis under the Lugar test shows that the criminal 
defendant cannot fairly be described as a state actorg5 when 
exercising peremptory challenges and the Court should not 
have reached a Fourteenth Amendment analysis in McCollum. 
The McCollum Court also gave insufficient attention t o  the 
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right t o  a fair and im- 
partial jury. That right is protected by the exercise of peremp- 
tory challenges t o  remove unwanted jurors. The McCollum 
holding puts what could become a formidable limitation on the 
criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges and 
ultimately a limitation on the criminal defendant's right to a 
fair and impartial jury. Such a limitation will work unjust 
results for criminal defendants and therefore deserves greater 
consideration when being balanced against possible racial dis- 
crimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment. 
Eric E. Vernon 
95. "Certainly, it is difficult to imagine anyone less a 'state actor' than a 
criminal defendant." Goldwasser, supra note 41, at 820. 
